
Book nE 



PRESENTED RY 



THE TRUTH CONCERNING 
THE UNITED STATES ARMY 



BY 



Frederic Louis Huidekoper 



Reprinted from the 
INFANTRY JOURNAL 

for May, igii. 



Washington 
June, 1911 



^^f 



AUQ 16 1^1^ 



THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE UNITED STATES 

ARMY.* 

By FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER. 

Note. — This article luas originally published by the holders of the copyright 
without the footnotes, and as published was read on the floor of Congress and 
printed in the Congressional Record of March 3, 191 1. The attention attracted to it 
at the time led to criticism by members of Congress, both in set speeches and in 
general debate, and to question, implied or direct, concerning the accuracy of the 
data upon which Mr. Hicidekoper's conclusions were founded. The footnotes 7vhich 
accompanied the article in its original form, and which are here printed for the 
first time, show hoiv far the critics were from understanding the research that had 
preceded the publication of the body of the article. Had these notes been available at 
the time the paper was under consideration it appears doubtful whether any member 
of Congress would have felt competent to question statements established by such 
indisputable authority. — Editor. 

'yHE AMERICAN PEOPLE should know that their Army 
"*■ is in a lamentable state and that our means of defense, 
except the Navy,f are virtually nil.| 

*Cop5Tighted, 191 1, by United Press Association. 

fThe United States Navy ranks third among the navies of the world. Vide 
Brassey's Naval Annual for 1910, pages 69 to 78. 
JFor the following reasons: 

1. Seacoast fortifications have been authorized and built, but there are 
not enough men in the present Coast Artillery Corps to man them; nor has 
Congress thus far voted all the necessary accessories, without which the guns 
will be of no more use in defense than so many dummies. 

Vide Annual report of the Chief of Coast Artillery, U. S. A. (General Arthur 
Murray), to the Chief of Staff, September i, 19 10, pages 5 to 15, and especially 
page 17. 

2. The present number of infantry in the Army and Organized Militia is 
insufficient for the field armies deemed necessary for national defense. 

Annual report of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army (General Leonard Wood), 
to the Secretary of War, dated October i, 19 10, pages 8 and 10. 

3. The United States has not enough small-arm ammunition on hand to 
meet the requirements of our Field Service Regulations for an army of 150,000 
infantry. 

According to the Field Service Regulations, the United States Army, for 
1910, Article VII, section 225, pages 144-145, mobile forces should be sup- 
plied with 330 rounds per rifle; 330 rounds should be kept at or near the ad- 
vance supply depot; and 660 rounds "should be available at the base of 
operations or other depots" — a total of 1,320 rounds per rifle. 

An army of 150,000 infantry and cavalry would therefore need 190,000,000 
rounds; but Brigadier General William Crozier, the Chief of Ordnance, testi- 
fied before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives 
on December 13, 1910, that "We expect to have on hand on June 30th next 
152 000,000 rounds." 



2 THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE ARMY. 

The recent report of the Secretary of War was made in conse- 
quence of a resolution introduced in the House of Representatives 
by the Hon. James McLachlan, a member from CaHfornia.* It 
disclosed a condition of affairs so disgraceful that it has been 
suppressed, under the excuse that it was purely " confidential, "f 
Mr. Dickinson's report probably did not contain one single thing 
which is not knov/n to well-informed military men both in the 
United States and all over the world. f 

Vide Hearing on Army Appropriation Bill for Fiscal Year 1911-12, page 313. 

4. There is not enough field artillery or field artillery ammunition to go 
into a campaign. 

Testimony of Major General Leonard Wood before the Committee on 
Military AfTairs of the House of Representatives, on December 14, 1910. 
Vide Hearing on the Army Appropriation Bill, page 335. 

5. We have no reserve for the Regular Army like that possessed by almost 
every European nation. 

Statement of existing fact. For the European armies which have reserves, 
vide the Statesman's Year Book for 1910 and Hazell's Annual for 191 1. 

6. The present laws are inadequate to deal with the situation at the out- 
break of war without additional legislation. 

The last law relating to the increase of the Regular Army to a maximum 
of 100,000 men was the Act of February 2, 1901 {vide U. S. Statutes at Large, 
vol. 31, pages 748-758); the last law relating to the Volunteers in operation 
at the present time, is the Act of April 22, 1898. There were twelve supple- 
mental or amendatory bills and within one year, on March 2, 1899, another 
law organizing the Volunteers on an entirely different principle, but "these 
acts are no longer in effect." Vide General Wood's report as Chief of Staff, 
pages 15 and 16.) The last law relating to the Militia is the Act of January 
21, 1903, known as "the Dick Bill." 

The defects of the bills of April 22, 1898, and January 21, 1903, are set 
forth by General Wood in his report, pages 7, 9, 10 and 14 to 24. 

7. The history of our past wars has demonstrated that such hasty meas- 
ures cannot be expected to provide for the necessities which only time and 
thorough preparation could properly and economically meet. 

Vide General Emory Upton's "The Military Policy of the United States;" 
Mr. Frederic L. Huidckoper's article, "Is the United vStates prepared for 
War?" (North American Review for February and March. 1906); and Presi- 
dent (then Secretary of War) Taft's introduction to the reprint of Mr. 
Huidckoper's article which was published in May, 1907. 

8. Our present condition is one of unpreparedness for war with any first- 
class power, and, obviously, there is reason for apprehension concerning our 
military forces. 

Vide General Wood's report as Chief of Staff, page 1 1 ; and also his testi- 
mony before the Military Affairs Committee, page 344. 

*0n May 19, 1910. 

fAccording to the accounts in the newspapers. 

{Why do nations send to the United States clever military attaches who 
can find almost anything they wish to know printed in the reports of War 



THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE ARMY. 3 

During the War of 18 12 our legislators did a lot of boasting 
that Canada could easily "be captured without soldiers and that a 
few volunteers and militia could do the business."* What hap- 
pened? In 1 8 14 the United States called out no less than 235,839 
troops, but, notwithstanding the size of these forces, Americans 
suffered the humiliation of seeing their much-vaunted plan of con- 
quest vanish in the smoke of a burning capital. f There is no man 
so blind as the man who refuses to see. True patriotism does not 
consist in bragging about one's own perfection, but in ascertain- 
ing the real condition of affairs and in rectifying the mistakes so 
far as lies within one's power. 

President Taft in his speech at the dinner given by the Ameri- 
can Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, 
on December 17th, emphasized strongly the fact that some na- 
tions are beginning to be threatened with bankruptcy by their 
tremendous armaments, but that the United States, being con- 
fronted by the existing conditions, must maintain its military and 
naval strength. This constantly increasing preparation for war 
will probably never cease until the nations of the world are willing 
to submit their differences to an International Arbitration Court 
and abide by its decision, he declared. 

Lasting peace is desirable above all other things, but to be 
weak when others are strong is to invite destruction. Might still 
makes right among nations, and it is high time that Americans 
knew the real value of their powers of defense. 

On October 15, 19 10, the United States Army consisted of 4,476 
officers and 72,559 men, a total of 77, 035. J In this country there 
are 59,687 troops; in the Philippines 17,000; and in Honolulu 

Department officials and in their testimony before Congressional committees? 
Even the amount of ammunition can be deduced to a nicety from these re- 
ports. The actual construction of our fortifications alone is one of the few, 
if not the only, thing they cannot find in print. 

*General Emory Upton, "The Military Policy of the United States," 
page 133. 

tUpton, page 133. 

tAccording to the report of the Adjutant General of the Army to the Secre- 
tary of War, dated October 31, 1910, it is stated, on page 7, that, as in pre- 
vious years, telegraphic reports were obtained showing that, the actual 
strength of the Army, on October 15, 1910, was "4,476 officers and 72,559 
enlisted men, not including 3,486 enlisted men of the Hospital Corps, but 
including 197 first lieutenants of the Medical Reserve Corps on active duty. " 

Vide also the Report of the Secretary of War to the President, dated 
December 5, 19 10. 



4 THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE ARMY. 

1,400.* The Militia numbers about 110,000 men.f In time of 
war the Regular Army could be increased to 100,000. J It would 
then contain no less than 30 per cent, of recruits and, conse- 
quently, be far below the fighting efficiency it ought to possess. § 
That is bad enough in itself. 

*According to the Report of the Adjutant General, page 9, the geographical 
distribution of the Army on October 15, 1910 — including the Philippine 
Scouts — was as follows: 

In the United States: 3,366 officers and 56,321 men 59.687 

In the Philippines: 
Regular Army : 

719 officers and 10,884 enlisted men 11,603 

Philippine Scouts: 

166 officers and 5,100 enlisted men 5,266 

16,869 

In Hawaii: — 72 officers and 1,334 enlisted men 1,406 

In Alaska: — 50 officers and 1,128 enlisted men 1,178 



79,140 

Vide also the Report of the Secretary of War for 19 10, page 6, with a slightly 
different grouping. 

fAccording to the Report of the Secretary of War for 1910, page 46, the 
"strength of the Organized Militia, as reported at the annual inspections, 
is 9,155 officers and 110,505 men, a net increase of 734 over last year. This 
includes 140 regiments, 9 separate battalions, 7 separate companies of infantry, 
69 troops of cavalry, 51 batteries of field artillery and 122 companies of coast 
artillery." 

Vide also Report of the Chief of Staff for 19 10, pages 7 and 8. 

tAccording to the Act approved on February 2, 1901, and entitled "An 
Act to Increase the Efficiency of the Permanent Military Establishment of 
the United States." Vide U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. 31, pages 748-758. 

§The Regular Army numbered, on October 15, 1910, 72,559, exclusive of 
3,486 enlisted men of the Hospital Corps {vide report of the Adjutant General 
for 1910, page 7), and also omitting the 5,572 in the Philippine Scouts. Adding 
to 72,559 the 3,486, the total would be 76,045 enlisted men. To raise this 
force to 100,000, its full war strength according to the present law, 23,955 
enlisted men would be needed. 

According to General Murray's report for 1910 (page 5), the authorized 
maximum strength of the Coast Artillery Corps is 19,321 enlisted men. Accord- 
ing to the Adjutant General's report for 1910 (page 7), on October 15, 1910, 
there were 1 7,930 of this corps with the colors. The Coast Artillery is therefore 
only 1,391 short of what it is allowed by the present law for war strength. 
Deducting this number from 23,955 leaves 22,564 to be distributed among the 
rest of the U. S. Army. 

As 76,045, the present strength of the Army, is 76 per cent of the 100,000 war 
strength, and, as the numbers of the staff corps and departments, the engineers 
and miscellaneous troops amount — according to the report of the Adjutant 
General for 1910, page 7 — to 10,043, about 2,400 would be needed to bring 



THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE ARMY. 5 

But the American Army to-day has only enough infantry 
ammunition for one single campaign.* At this instant the field 
artillery does not possess enough manufactured ammunition to 
fight so much as one battle. f At the end of the Civil War the 

these troops to their war strength. Deducting 2,400 from the above-mentioned 
22,564 leaves 20,164 to be distributed to the fighting arms— that is, the 
infantry, cavalry and artillery. 

The Adjutant General (Report, page 7) gives their figures on October 15, 
1 9 10, as follows: 

Infantry 23,666 

Cavalry 11 ,003 

Field Artillery 4.807 

Total 39.476 enlisted men. 

20,164 is slightly more than 51 per cent of 39,476. The statement made in 
the text that the Regular Army would then contain no less than 30 per cent 
of recruits is therefore correct. Certainly, so far as concerns the fighting arms, 
it is considerably exceeded, and, needless to say, a force so constituted would 
be far below the fighting efficiency it ought to possess. 

*In determining what small-arm ammunition would be used in a modern 
campaign, needless to say we shall take the last great war, the Russo-Japanese 
War, as the criterion. 

Colonel Monkevitz of the Russian General Staff has stated officiallj' that 
"The total number of rifle cartridges shot during the last war amounts to 
about 170,000,000" rounds. 

In the "Etude sur les Caracteres Generaux de la Guerre d'ljxtreme-Orient" 
by Capt. F. Culman, on page 47, is the following assertion: 

"The Russian Army used 155,000,000 rounds of infantry ammunition 
during the whole campaign." 

On December 13, 1910, Brig.-Gen. William Crozier, the Chief of Ordnance, 
U. S. Army, stated in his testimony before the Committee on Military Affairs 
of the House of Representatives that "We expect to have on hand on June 
30th next [June 30, 191 1], 152,000,000 rounds" of small-arm ammunition. 
{Vide Hearing on Army Appropriation Bill for Fiscal Year 191 1-12, page 313.) 

As the United States has not yet on hand these 152,000,000 rounds, it 
follows that it has not enough infantry ammunition for one campaign. 

tGeneral Wood, in his report as Chief of Staff, page 6, stated that "we 
are sadly deficient in the reserve supply of field artillery and field artillery 
ammunition" and that "at the present rate of appropriation, it is estimated 
to take over fifty years to secure a reasonable supply of ammunition" — 
assertions which were emphasized by the Secretary of War in his report for 
1910, page 41. 

In further corroboration. General Wood, in his testimony before the Com- 
mittee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives on December 14, 
1 9 10, declared that "in the way of field artillery ammunition we have for the 
guns already made less than one-third the field service allowance per gun; 
and this is all we have." 



THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE ARMY. 



"Now the field service regulations — the campaign regulations — provide 
for something over 1,350 rounds of ammunition per gun, and they provide 
for 4I guns per 1,000 rifles and sabres, so that you can see the condition 
of unpreparedness as to this ammunition we are in. We are in a situation 
now where we have not enough field artillery ammunition to go into a 
campaign." 

{Vide Hearing on Army Appropriation Bill, 1911-1912, page 335-) 

General Wood went on to testify that "Reports indicate that one European 
army [i. e., the German] carries 2,800 rounds per gun. We do not contemplate 
asking for a reserve of that size per gun. We ask for 1,350 rounds per gun." 

"... We ought to have 1,350 rounds per gun, and we ought to have of 
field artillery 3- inch pieces at least 1,000 guns, whereas we have only 432 now. 
That would give us artillery for only 250,000 rifles; the very minimum we 
should consider." 

According to General Wood's statement, it appears that the United States 
has less than one-third of 1,350 rounds per each 3-inch gun — i. e., about 450 
rounds. Moreover he asserted (Testimony, page 335) that we have only 
432 3-inch guns. Multiplying 450 by 432 gives 194,400 rounds as the maximum 
amount of field artillery ammunition on December 14, 19 10 — the date when 
he testified. 

That 194,400 rounds is insufficient to fight one modern battle such as the 
great battles in the Russo-Japanese War is apparent from some of the evidence 
collected by Mr. Huidekoper. 

In the v,'ork, entitled "Etude sur les Caracteres Generaux de la Guerre 
d':fextreme-Orient, " by Capt. F. Culman (page 46), the statement is made by 
General Rohne of the Germany Army — the leading expert on data relating to 
field artilleri' — that at Mukden the Russians expended 250,000 rounds of field 
artillery ammunition. 

Colonel Monkevitz, of the Russian General Staff, has stated officially that 
the total quantity of ammunition fired during the ten days' battle of Mukden 
equals about 400,000 rounds. 

According to General Wood, the United States has less than 450 rounds 
per 3-inch gun at the present time. That this would be insufficient for a modern 
battle is borne out by the following data: 

General Rohne writes, in the "Jahrbucher fiir die deutsche Armee und 
Marine" for January-June, 1906, pages 2 and 3, that "in the battle of Taschi- 
chao, July 11-24, o"^ battery of 8 guns fired 4,178 rounds, that is 522 rounds 
per gun ... At Liao Yang the artillery of the ist and 3d Siberian Corps 
fired 108,000 rounds on two days, that is at the rate of 6,750 rounds for each 
battery, 840 rounds for each gun and 420 rounds for each gun for each day 
of the battle ..." 

Lieutenant Ulrich, of the German Army, who was with the Russian Army, 
gives on page 187 of the "Jahrbucher f'r die deutsche Armee und Marine," for 
January-June, 1906, his data from the four days' action at the Shaho, Sep- 
tember 29 to October 2, both inclusive, showing that the minimum number 
of rounds fired by the Russian guns was 100 rounds per day and the maximum 
3643 per day. 

In the "Sweigersche Zeitschrift fijr Artillerie und Genie" for June, iQio. is a 
table showing that the Russians used the following field artillery ammunition • 

At the battle of Taschichao on July 24, 1904, the 2d Battery of the 9th 



THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE ARMY. 7 

Union Army had 1,800 pieces of artillery.* The United States 
Army today possesses but 572 guns of all calibers. f 

The American officers rank with any in the world, and our Army 
has more technical troops proportionately than are to be found in 
almost any other army of 450,000 men. J The backbone of any 
army is always the infantry. The brunt of the fighting falls on 
the infantry. When the reserves are called into action, the in- 
fantry is the only arm which has every man engaged in a battle. § 

Our Army today has only 30 regiments of infantry. Eight of 

East Siberian Artillery Brigade fired 4,178 rounds, which is at the rate of 522 
rounds per gun per day. 

At the battle of Liao-Yang on August 30, 1904, 16 batteries of the ist and 
3d East Siberian Corps fired 100,000 rounds or 422 rounds per gun per day. 

At Mukden on March 3, 1905, the ist Battery of the 9th Artillery Brigade 
fired 4,034 rounds or 504 rounds per gun per day. 

Could the American Field Artillery do the work which it ought to do in 
a modern battle lasting several days with only 450 rounds per gun? 

*General Wood's testimony before the Committee on Military Affairs of 
the House of Representatives, December 14, 1910, pages 335 and 345. 

General Wood's authority was undoubtedly the "Statement of Ordnance, 
Arms, Ammunition, and other Ordnance Stores procured and Supplies to the 
Army and the Quantity remaining on hand at the close of the Fiscal Year 
ending June 30, 1865. 

Field guns of different calibers i 735 

(Signed) A. B. Dyer, 

Brigadier-General, 
Chief of Ordnance. 

Ordnance Office, October 20, 1865." 

This statement will be found in the Report of the Secretary of War to the 
President, dated November 22, 1865, Volume II, page 998. 

fGeneral Wood's testimony before the Military Affairs Committee. (Hear- 
ing, etc., page 335.) 

JCountry. Peace Strength. Sanitary Troops. 

France 634,638 6,123 

Germany 634,320 6,615 

Austria-Hungary 327,580 4,307 

Italy 288,409 3,729 

Great Britain 255,438 5,069 

J^P^n 230,000 3,484 

United States 81,361 4,117 

The percentage of Sanitary Troops to the peace strength is: France, 0.96; 
Germany, 1.04; Austria, 1.31; Italy, 1.29; Great Britain, 1.98; Japan, 1.51; 
and the United States, 5.06. 

'^Vide statement made by General Kuropatkin, "The Russian Army and 
the Japanese War," (translated by Capt. A. B. Lindsay. Edited by Maj. 
E. D. Swinton, Distinguished Service Order, Royal Engineers, 2 vols.. New 
York, E. P. Dutton &: Co., 1909), vol. II, p. 155. 



8 THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE ARMY. 

these are in the Philippines, and one in Alaska and Honolulu, 
leaving only 21 in the United States, Granting that all of these 
2 1 regiments could be utilized, how long would they stand against 
the 200,000 troops which every military man knows that Germany 
could land within our territorial limits on the Atlantic coast or 
Japan on the Pacific coast within five weeks after the declaration 
of war?* There certainly ought to be fully 54 regiments or six 
infantry divisions in the United States. | 

The very best that we can do at present would be to put 40,000 
to 50,000 men on our western coast in two weeks. J Owing to the 
absence of proper laws, no plan exists by which any large force 
could be placed in the field completely equipped for war.§ Even 
if the President were to call for 400,000 volunteers at the out- 
break of hostilities, the existing laws are so defective that these 
troops could not be properly organized without additional legis- 
lation. II Even such legislation, if enacted at the last minute, could 
scarcely fail to reproduce the conditions which marked the begin- 
ning of the Spanish-American War.1[ As a matter of fact, the 
United States cannot today put on shipboard in 24 hours one 
regiment fully ready for war, as some of the European armies can 
easily do with an entire army corps. 

We Americans think our militia a wonderful force. Nothing 
could be farther from the truth from a military standpoint.** Read 
the history of our past wars and see for yourself how much value 
they have often been as a purely military asset. ff Our militia has 
run away or mutinied in no less than thirty battles or marches 

*Mr. Huidekoper's article, "Is the United States prepared for War?" 
North Atnericatt Review for March, 1906, and reprint of this article (May, 
1907), pages 42 and 43. 

tCompare General Wood's Report as Chief of Staff for 19 10, page 10. 

IThat is, fully prepared for war. Statement of common knowledge among 
Army officers. Compare statement made by Hon. James McLachlan in his 
speech in the House of Representatives, on May 19, 1910. 

§Generars Wood report, pages 7, 8, 11, and 14 to 24. 

'iVide President Taft's introduction to the reprint of Mr. Huidekoper's 
article. 

These facts are too well known to require further authority. The short- 
comings in the present Volunteer and Militia bills are set forth by General 
Wood in his report, pages 14 to 24. 

*!President Taft's introduction to Mr. Huidekoper's article. 

**Compare Washington's letter to the President of Congress, September 
15, 1780. Sparks 's Writings of Washington, Vol. VII, pages 205-206. 

tfThis fact is abundantly proved by General Upton's "The Military Policy 
of the United States." 



THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE ARMY. 9 

between 1776 and 1861.* The militia must not be blamed for the 
defective system which has been permitted to remain in force so 
long. They have always done splendidly when given an oppor- 
tunity to learn war in actual fighting, f 

War used to last 100 years. | Now it lasts one year or less, and 
preparation must be made beforehand. § All things considered 
Pennsylvania possesses the best State Militia.il Its training is 
confined to one week in camp and about seventy hours of drill 

*The Militia Ran Away or Deserted. 

Long Island August 27, 1776. 

Evacuation of New York September 15, 1776. 

Brandywine September 11, 1777. 

Camden, S. C August 16, 1780. 

Guilford Court House, N. C March 15, 1781. 

Indian Village near Fort Wayne, Ind October 22, 1790. 

Darke County, Ohio November 4, 1791. 

Frenchtown and Raisin River, Ind January 18 to 22, 1813. 

Sackett's Harbor May 29, 1813. 

French Creek, N. Y November i to 5, 1813. 

Chrystler's Field, Canada November 11, 1813. 

Evacuation of Fort George, Niagara River December 10, 18 13. 

Burning of Buffalo and Black Rock, N. Y December 30. 18 13. 

Bladensburg, Maryland August 24, 1814. 

New Orleans, La January 8, 1815. 

Lake Okeechobee, Fla December 25, 1837. 

Bull Run, Va July 21, 1861. 

The Militia Mutinied. 

Morristown, N. J January i, 1781. 

Pompton, N. J January 24 to 28, 1781. 

Lancaster, Pa June, 1783. 

On the march from Urbana, Ohio, to Detroit, Mich June, 1812. 

Detroit, Mich July, 1812. 

On the march from Fort Harrison, Ind., to the Wabash 

and Illinois Rivers October 19, 1812. 

En route to the rapids of the Maumee River October, 1812. 

En route from Plattsburg, N. Y., to Canada November, 18 12. 

Battle of Queenstown October 13, 1813. 

Fort Strother, Fla November, 1813. 

Retreat to Buffalo after the evacuation of Fort George . . December, 1 8 13. 

Withlacoochee River, Fla December 31, 1835. 

Charlestown, W. Va July 16 to 18, i86i. 

These tables and the authorities for every statement in them will be found 
in the reprint of Mr. Huidekoper's article, pages 2,3, 34 and 35. 

tMr. Huidekoper's article, pages 15, 36, 37 and 41. 

JFor example, "The Hundred Years War" which lasted from 1339 to 1453. 

SPresident Taft's introduction to Mr. Huidekoper's article. 

Wide report of the Chief of the Division of MiHtia Affairs for 1910, especi- 
ally pages 203 to 207. 



lo THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE ARMY. 

a year.* How long would they stand against German regulars or 
Japan's veterans? How much faith would the officials of any 
corporation place in an agent or employee whose training was 
limited to one week and seventy hours of work a yearPf 

Even the Dick Bill| leaves it to the Governors of the State^ 
to call out the Militia, and no Governor is compelled to obey.§ 
The result is that many military men think it easier at the out- 
break of war to form civilians into United States Volunteers.il 

The Act of 1792^ is practically still in force, having been 
embodied in effect into all subsequent bills, and Governors can 
refuse to call out their Militia,** as did the Governors of Massa- 
chusetts, Connecticut and Vermont in 1812, 1813 and i8i4.tt 
The "Extra Officers Bill, " lately before Congress, provides for the 
creation of 612 additional officers, 300 as instructors and inspec- 
tors of Militia, tl All of them would be available in war for volun- 
teer commissions. It is to be hoped most earnestly that Congress 
will eventually provide all these much-needed extra officers. 

The location of posts in the Army is most defective. §^ Moun- 
tain batteries have been placed several days' march from any 
mountains ; II II cavalry garrisons are put in the North, where they 
are snowed up half the year;^^ and some infantry posts where they 
are useless, being far from the centers of distribution.*** The 
location of posts has been due to three causes : ( i ) Indian frontier 

*Mr. Huidekoper's article, page 41. Also letter from Gen. Thomas J. 
Stewart, Adjutant General of Pennsylvania, to Mr. Huidekoper, dated 
January 28, 191 1. 

fMr. Huidekoper's article, " Is the United States prepared for War?" page 41. 

jThe Act approved January 21, 1903. 

§ Vide General Wood's report, page 24. 

IIFrom the standpoint of the Government. The Militia must first be called 
into the service of the United States. A Governor can prevent the raising 
of Volunteers within his State by calling the Militia into active duty of that 
State. 

Vide General Wood's report, page 23. 

HThe Act of May 8, 1792. 

**General Wood's report, pages 23 and 24. 

tfMr. Huidekoper's article, pages 35 and 36. 

JJSenate bill number 1024, Si.xty-first Congress, First Session, introduced by 
Senator Warren on April i, 1909. 

§§For example. Fort Thomas, Kentucky; Fort Assiniboine, Montana; and 
Fort Wingate, New Mexico. 

llllFor example, part of the Fourth Field Artillery at Fort Sheridan, Illinois. 

HUAs at Foit Assiniboine, Montana, and at Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont. 

***Such as Forts Meade, North Dakota; Assiniboine, Montana; Missoula, 
Montana; D. A. Russell, Wyoming; Wingate, New Me.xico, and Huaehuca, 
Arizona. 



THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE ARMY. ii 

conditions in the past; (2) the opening of the West — the troops 
now in Alaska are there partly for that purpose;* and (3) political 
influence. 

Often the War Department has tried to abandon posts worth- 
less from a military standpoint, but has been compelled to counter- 
mand the order, owing to political pressure, f The most positive 
step in concentration was the reduction of the Coast Artillery 
posts attempted by General Murray for administrative purposes 
and better instruction. There were 77 Coast Artillery forts in the 
27 defended harbors.! General Murray proposed to concen- 
trate them in 29 garrisons, but so great was the local and political 
opposition that in some places his plan had to be abandoned 
wholly. § 

*Vide General Wood's testimony before the Military Aflfairs Committee 
of the House. Hearing, etc., page 346. 
fGeneral Wood's testimony, page 360. 
JThe twenty-seven defended harbors are: 
I. Kennebec River, Maine; 2. Portland, Maine; 3. Portsmouth, Maine; 

4. Boston, Mass.; 5. New Bedford, Mass.; 6. Narragansett Bay, R. I.; 7. 
Eastern Entrance Long Island Sound; 8. Eastern New York; 9.- Southern 
New York; 10. Delaware River; 11. Baltimore; 12. Potomac River; 13. 
Hampton Roads, Virginia; 14. Cape Fear River, N, C; 15. Charleston, 

5. C; 16. Savannah, Georgia; 17. Key West, Florida; 18. Tampa, Florida; 
19. Pensacola, Florida; 20. Mobile, Alabama; 21. Mississippi River; 22. 
Galveston, Texas; 23. San Diego, California; 24. San Francisco; 25. Columbia 
River, Oregon; 26. Puget Sound, Washington; 27. Guantanamo, Cuba. 

If the names of the 77 forts are wanted, they can be found in the Army list 
and Directory for January 20, 191 1, pages 25 and 26. 

§This opposition was encountered when two companies were taken away 
from Fort Mott, New Jersey. Much opposition has also been encountered 
with reference to the contemplated abandonment of Fort Fremont, South 
Carolina. So much opposition was expected in abandoning the Jackson 
Barracks, that two companies are still retained there for the present. 

The 32 forts embraced in General Murray's scheme are as follows: 

Williams and McKinley at Portland, Maine; the new post being built at 
Portsmouth, Maine; Strong and Andrews at Boston; Rodman at New Bed- 
ford; Greble and Adams in Narragansett Bay; Terry and H. G. Wright at 
New London, Conn.; Totten in Eastern New York; Hancock and Hamilton 
in Southern New York; Du Pont in the Delaware; Howard in Baltimore; 
Washington in the Potomac; Monroe in the Chesapeake; Caswell in the Cape 
Fear River, N. C; Moultrie at Charleston, S. C; Screven at Savannah; 
Taylor at Key West; Dade at Tampa; Barrancas at Pensacola, Florida; 
Morgan at Mobile; St. Philip at New Orleans; Crockett at Galveston, 
Texas; Rosecrans at San Diego; Baker and Winfield Scott at San Francisco; 
Stevens in the Columbia River; and Ward, Casey and Worden in Puget 
Sound. 

Work was started at Guantanamo but has been discontinued, owing to a 
change in policy. 



12 THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE ARMY 

The American Army has no reserve, because of our defective 
laws. General Leonard Wood recently called the attenton of the 
Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives 
to the fact that the Army is graduating by expiring enlistments 
30,000 soldiers each year. These men have seen three years' 
service, but no means exist to utilize them in time of war,* 

No bill ever introduced in Congress to create them into a re- 
serve has thus far passed. Had any such measure gone into effect 
ten years ago,t and had the War Department the necessary 
reserve supplies and ammunition, we Americans would possess 
today — including the Regular Army and the Organized Militia — 
a force of fully 450,000 trained men, all that the United States 
ought ever to need. 

Never in our history have we been prepared for war, A good 
business man cannot be made in a day or a month; neither 
can a good soldier. | To employ untrained material is always 
dangerous and very expensive. § In the Revolution we used 
231,771 Regulars! and 164,087 Militia and Volunteers^ against 
England's 150,605 ;** yet it cost us $37o,ooo,oootf and $70,000,000 
in pensions. + J 

In the War of 1812 we had 56,032 Regulars and 471,622 
Militia §§ against the English and Canadian forces of only about 

*General Wood's testimony, pages 342 and 343. Also his report as Chief 
of Staff, page 1 1 . 

fGeneral Wood's testimony, pages 342 and 343; General Wood's report, 
page II. 

The Chief of Staff is convinced that such a measure would create a reserve 
of 300,000 men in ten years. 

JPresident (then Secretary of War) Taft, in his introduction to the reprint 
of Mr. Huidekoper's article, "Is the United States prepared for War?" 
emphasizes that "It is a fact, whether the American citizens realize it or not, 
that time is indispensable to the making of good soldiers. Our own sad 
experience proves this proposition." 

§General Upton's "The Military Policy of the United States;" Mr. Huide- 
koper's article, and especially the table contained on page 16 of the reprint, 
from which many of the figures used below are taken. 

llGeneral Upton, "The Military Power of the United States," page 58. 

^Returns and estimates of the Secretary of War; American State Papers, 
vol. I, pages 14 to 19. 

**Original returns in the British Record Office, quoted by H. B. Carrington, 
"Battles of the American Revolution, "pages 93, 301, 321, 462, 483, 502 and 646. 

ttUpton, page 66; Ingersoll, "The Second War," vol. I, page 14. 

JtReport of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1910, page 11. 

§§Records of the Adjutant General's Office. Also Upton, page 137. 



THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE ARMY. 13 

55,000 men.* That war cost us $82,627, oogf and $45,808,676 
in pensions. t 

In the Mexican War 31,024 Regulars§ and 73,532 Militia! were 
required to conquer about 46,000 Mexicans,^ at a cost of $88,500, 
208,** and the pensions have amounted to $43,956, 768. ft 

In the Civil War the United States employed no less than 
67,000 Regulars+t and 2,605,341 MiHtia andVolunteers^^ to defeat 
about 1,000,000 Confederates.il il The war cost the fabulous sum 
of $5, 371, 079, 748,^11 and $3,837,488,171 have already been paid 
in pensions,*** and we are a long way from the end yet. 

*Braiinan's Letters and Gleig's British Campaigns, quoted by Upton, page 
138. To the above number must be added 1,810 miUtia and 9,825 Indians. 

fAnnual report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1906, page 100 and 102. Also Upton, page 141. 

JAnnual report of the Commissioner of Pensions for the fiscal year ending 
June 30.. 1 9 10, page 11. 

§Upton, page 221. 

llUpton, page 216, 

^Alphabetical List of Battles, 1754-1900, pages 236-237. Compiled from 
official records by Newton A. Strait. 

**Annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1 906, page 100 and 102. 

ttAnnual report of the Commissioner of Pensions for 19 10, page 11. 

tlPhisterer, Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States (Campaigns 
of the Civil War Series), page 11. 

§§Ofricial Records in the Office of the Military Secretary; Memorandum 
relative to the probable number of and ages of Army and Navy survivors 
of the Civil W'^ar, page 4 (published by the Military Secretary's office. May 15, 
1905); Reply of the Military Secretary (General Ainsworth), dated August 
28, 1905, to Mr. Huidekoper's letter of inquiry. 

The total number of soldiers, both Regular and Volunteers, was 2,672,341. 

llllBattles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol IV, page 768. The numbers 
employed by the Confederacy have been variously estimated from 700,000 
to 1,500,000. Livermore, "Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America," 
page 63, reckons the numbers between 1,227,890 and 1,406,180. These 
calculations are at best conjectural since, as the Military Secretary wrote, 
on August 28, 1905, to Mr. Huidekoper: "No compilation has ever been 
prepared by this (the War) Department from which even an approximately 
accurate statement can be made concerning the number of troops in the 
Confederate Army, and it is impracticable to make such a compilation because 
of the incompleteness of the collection of Confederate records in possession 
of the Department." 

11 ^Senate Executive Document number 206, Forty-sixth Congress, Second 
Session. Letter of Hoc. John Sherman, Secretary of the Treasury, dated 
June 10, 1880, transmitting a statement of the "Expenditures necessarily 
growing out of the War of the Rebellion, July i, 1861, to June 30, 1879," 
a total of not less than $6,189,929,908.58. 

***Report of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1910, page 11. 



14 THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE ARMY. 

The Spanish-American War compelled us to use 58,688 Regu- 
lars* and 223,235 Militia or Volunteersf to subdue 200.000 
Spaniards, if at a cost of $32i,833,254§; while 76,416 Regulars|| 
and 50,052 Volunteers Tl were employed in the Philippines, at a 
cost of $171,326,572,** and $30,191,725 have already been paid 
in pensions for them both.ff 

How many Americans have any conception of the outrageous 
extravagance in men and money that has characterized our past 
wars? How long would any properly-run company or corpora- 
tion tolerate any such mismanagement? 

Until the last few years our annual expenditures for pensions 
have exceeded what it cost to maintain the German army.|t Since 
1 79 1 our War Department has cost $6,845,129,239 and our pen- 
sions no less than $4, 115, 829,223. §§ The size of our present pen- 

*Report of the Adjutant General, dated November i, 1898, in the report 
of the Secretary of War for 1898, pages 145, 147 and 260. 

fStatistical Exhibit of the Strength of the Volunteer forces called into service 
during the War with Spain, issued by the Adjutant General on December 13, 
1899. Also Strait, pages 20S-209. 

JInternational Year Book for 1898, page 722 ; Henry Cabot Lodge, "History 
of the War with Spain," page 18. 

^Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1906, pages 100 and 102. 

IIReport of the Adjutant General, dated November i, 1898. 

^[Report of the Adjutant General, dated November i, 1898. 

**From May, 1898, to April, 1902, both inclusive, according to the statement 
sent to the Senate by the Secretary of War on June 19, 1902. 

tfReport of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1910, page 11. 

tJThe following table shows the cost of pensions to the United States and 
the Army to Germany during the last twenty years: 

American 
pensions. 

1891 $124,415,915 

1892 134.583,052 

1893 159,357.557 

1894 141,177,284 

1895 141,395,228 

1896 139,434,000 

1897 141,053,164 

1898 147,452,368 

1899 139,394,929 

1900 140,877,316 



German 




American 


German 


Army. 




pensions. 


Army. 


$94,200,203 


I 901 . . . 


• • $139:323,621 


$166,389,750 


103,279,477 


I 902 . . . 


. . 138.488,559 


168,414,000 


106,821,300 


1903. . . 


. . 138,425,646 


163,562,400 


107,008,200 


1904. .. 


. . 142,559,266 


162,093,750 


120,005,471 


1905. . . 


.. 141,773,964 


161,678,250 


118,053,100 


1906. . . 


. . 141,034,561 


176,438.500 


119,768,500 


1907. . . 


• • 139,309,514 


188,258,750 


134,993,250 


1908. . . 


. . 153,892,467 


199,846,500 


152,050,500 


1909... 


. . 161,710,367 


213,742,500 


160,625,250 


1910. . . 


160,696,415 


197.687,376 



The figures for the American pensions will be found in the Report of the 
Secretary of the Treasury for 19 10, page 112. The cost of maintenance of 
the German Army is taken from the Statesman's Year Books for the years 
1 891 to 1 910, both inclusive. 

§§Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1910, pages no, iii and 112. 



THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE ARMY. 15 

sion list is a disgrace to any civilized nation, and this condition 
of affairs will probably continue until the name of every pen- 
sioner is published once a month in the local newspaper of the 
city, town, or village where he lives. Public opinion will do the 
rest. 

Washington declared that we "ought to have a good army 
rather than a large one. "* Today we have neither, and the Army 
needs a thorough re-organization, beginning at the bottom, not 
the top.f The proportion of cavalry, artillery and infantry to 
each other in the so-called brigade posts is distinctly faulty. | 
We ought to have — exclusive of the Militia — a Regular Army of 
125,000 to 150,000 troops and a Reserve of at least 250,000 men 
who have had former service in the Regulars or Volunteers in 
time of war. It is estimated that this could be done, if the proper 
laws were passed, for little more than the Army costs at present. § 
Certainly if only the just pensions were paid, such a saving could 
be effected that American tax-payers would pay less than they 
now do for the cost of the Army and pensions. 

If the United States possesssed an Army and Reserve of 375,000 
troops, all of whom had had three years' service in the Regulars, 
and an Organized Militia of 125,000 men, thoroughly equipped 
and organized as they ought to be. it would have nothing to fear 
from any other nation in the world. At the present our defensive 
strength is lamentably weak. Napoleon won his battles because 
he outnumbered his adversaries on almost every occasion ;li when 
he ceased to outnumber them, even he fell. 

We Americans seem to have sublime faith in the truth of the 
remark once made by Bismarck that "the Lord takes care of 
babes, fools and the United States." If we were wise we would 
bear constantly in mind the warning uttered by Washington in 
his speech to Congress on December 3, 1793 : 

There is a rank due to these United States among nations 
which would be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation 
of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult we must be able to re- 



*Washington's letter to the President of Congress, dated September 15, 
1780. Vide Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. VII, page 206. 

flNFANTRY JOURNAL for July, 1910, pages 127 to 129. 

JEspecially in the over-proportion of cavalry. F/<ie Army List and Direc- 
tory, January 20, 191 1. 

Also General Wood's testimony, pages 360 to 362. 

§General Wood's testimony, pages 340 to 343. 

llAusterlitz (1805) and Leipzig (18 13) were the only great battles in which 
he was not superior in numbers to his opponents. 



1 6 THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE ARMY. 

pel it ; if we desire to secure peace ... it must be known that 
we are at all times ready for war.* 

If Congress would provide a proper organization in sufficient 
time to be in thorough working order before our next war and 
would heed what Calhoun said in 1820, "that at the commence- 
ment of hostilities there should be nothing either to new model 
or create, "t some profit will then have been derived from our 
costly lessons of the past. 

When will our American people awake to the facts and when 
will our legislators heed the handwriting on the wall ? 

*Sparks's "Writings of Washington," vol. XII, page 38; Richardson, 
"Messages and Papers of the Presidents," vol. I, page 140. 
fAmerican State Papers, vol. II, page 189. 



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